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1 INTRODUCTION
Abstract
It is difficult to find dissent from the proposition that it is desirable to
reduce the energy required to keep buildings warm. However, translating
this proposition into material investment in retrofitting existing buildings
and raising minimum standards for new buildings is challenging given both
the range of social interests impacted by implementation (building owners,
occupants, utility companies, future generations, developers, etc.) and the
fact that the financial benefits of energy saving are predicated on a coun-
terfactual analysis and accrue over many years. Regulation of the energy
performance of buildings, both newly constructed and renovated, is thus an
area with much scope for contestation. In an attempt to establish a com-
mon approach, the European Commission (as part of the 2010 recast of the
Energy Performance of Buildings Directive) required member states to cal-
culate “cost optimal” building standards, meaning the standards for which
the combined (discounted) costs of energy efficiency measures and resulting
energy demand over a thirty year period would be minimised. As costs of
measures and energy vary across states, as do climatic conditions and the
characteristics of the building stock, the Commissions methodology allowed
that the “cost optimal” standard would be different in different states. In this
paper I discuss the reports submitted by three states (the UK, Denmark and
Germany) to the Commission, and argue that, far from the methodology es-
tablishing a common baseline it afforded considerable flexibility for states to
present quite different analyses. To the extent these analyses justified build-
ing standards already in place they reflect the (temporarily settled) outcome
of negotiation among various interests, but in their selection of appropriate
calculative techniques they also illustrate broader energy policy paradigms
in each country. In particular I argue that the meaning (and not just the pa-
rameters) of “cost optimality” in the three countries is linked to dominant
policy visions of the role of markets in determining outcomes and the range
of supply-side futures entertained by policymakers.
1 Introduction
Chiapello (2014) draws attention to the growth of financialised policy making: in-
creasingly across a range of policy domains decision making is being driven by
procedures drawn from financial economics and mathematical finance. Chiapello
is concerned that financialised valuation marginalises alternative approaches to
calculation or valuation, and risks “a loss of freedom and meaning” (p. 15). One
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important conduit for the promotion of financialised valuation is the European
Union which, Chiapello (2014) suggests, is in the vanguard of this development.
In this paper I analyse one example of EU-directed financialisation of governance.
The example concerns regulatory standards for energy efficiency of buildings,
and the form of financialised governance stipulated is the calculation of “cost-
optimal” (in Net Present Value terms) levels of energy efficiency. My analysis
is geared to exploring the discretion afforded to Member States in compliance
with required financialised procedures, and thereby to understanding the extent
to which freedom (of national governments) to construct energy demand in dif-
ferent ways is maintained.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the calculations required
by the EU for states to assess “cost-optimal” levels of energy efficiency. Sec-
tion 3 examines how three states, Denmark, Germany and the UK, took differ-
ent approaches to these calculations. Calculative differences are found to sig-
nificantly shape the outcomes, with the UK’s approach leading to lower energy
efficiency standards than the Danish and German approaches. Section 4 explores
factors shaping calculative procedures in each country, and suggests in conclu-
sion that differences are not post hoc rationalisations of standards adopted for dif-
ferent reasons, but reflect different evaluation cultures (c.f. MacKenzie and Spears,
2014).
2 The 2010 EU Energy Performance of Buildings Di-
rective (EPBD)
The EPBD1 contains a variety of measures designed to promote energy efficiency
in buildings. Several of these focus on minimum standards set out in building
regulations, applicable to new buildings and existing buildings undergoing ren-
ovation. The directive does not prescribe particular standards, but requires Mem-
ber States (MSs) to:
calculate cost-optimal levels of minimum energy performance require-
ments using the comparative methodology framework established [by
the EU Commission] and relevant parameters, such as climatic condi-
tions and the practical accessibility of energy infrastructure, and com-
1The 2010 Energy Performance of Buildings Directive is actually a “recast” of a 2003 directive.
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pare the results of this calculation with the minimum energy perfor-
mance requirements in force. (EPBD Article 5, paragraph 2.)
Where regulated minimum performance standards are less efficient than the cost
optimal, and the MS is unable to offer an adequate justification for the gap, the
directive requires it take steps to bring regulation into line with the calculated
optimal.
2.1 European Commission methodology for calculating cost op-
timal energy efficiency
The methodology by which Member States were to calculate cost optimal levels
was published two years later in 2012. It used a form of Cost-Benefit Analysis
(CBA) and set out what costs and benefits were to be appraised. These included
capital costs of measures, maintenance costs, costs of energy, carbon emissions
(expressed in monetary terms), and residual value of equipment at the end of the
calculation period. The methodology also prescribed how energy performance
was to be expressed, as modelled primary energy demand divided by floor area.
The methodology also set out a range of other factors not explored in this paper
(such as the selection of reference building types).
MSs were to identify a range of possible energy efficiency standards by modelling
different packages of technology (principally fabric insulation, microgeneration).
For each package the primary energy demand was to be calculated using each
MSs approach to building physics modelling. The “global cost” of each package
could then be calculated as the Net Present Value of costs and benefits over a
thirty year period. Broadly put, the “cost optimal” energy efficiency level would
be that corresponding to the package of measures with the lowest global cost,
which the commission illustrated this graphically (figure 1).
However, while the commission stipulated a range of costs and benefits to be in-
cluded in the analysis, it left several key aspects of the methodology to MSs dis-
cretion. In particular two CBA perspectives were described: a microeconomic per-
spective reflecting “the limitations to the investor” (European Commission, 2012,
p. 15) and a macroeconomic perspective which “encompass[es] a broader public
good perspective” (p. 14). The two approaches represent costs in any given year
(i.e. before a discount factor is applied) in different ways. Taxes and subsidies
are generally included in microeconomic analyses and excluded from macroeco-
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Figure 1: Illustration of cost optimal energy efficiency levels. (From European
Commission, 2012, figure 5.)
nomic analysis, the underlying theory of CBA treating taxes as financial trans-
fers between groups in society rather than as using up the economic resources
available to a society. For energy the micro/macro distinction can become more
complicated as certain non-tax costs incurred across a society, such as the costs of
maintaining network infrastructure, are considered not to change with reduced
levels of demand (see e.g. DECC, 2015). However, the way these costs are ap-
portioned may be related to different levels of demand (for example, large users
may pay a higher charge for network maintenance). A building with reduced
energy demand may consequently incur a lower share of overall energy system
costs without those overall costs falling to the same extent. (The difference may
simply be passed on to other users in the form of higher energy tariffs).
MSs were required to calculate global costs from both micro- and macroeconomic
perspectives, but were free to chose which one to use in determining their cost
optimal level. In addition, while the Commission offered some comments on the
appropriate discount rate to use, this was also left to MS discretion.
These degrees of freedom are significant to the CBA appraisal of energy efficiency
technologies. Energy savings typically accrue over a long period (the commis-
sion required calculations to cover 30 years), so seemingly small differences in a
discount rate can have considerable impact on their net present value (roughly,
because of the infamous power of compound interest). Lower discount rates will,
ceteris paribus, tend to increase the value of energy savings. The choice between
micro and macroeconomic analysis can also have a significant impact. Inclusion
of both taxes and non-variable energy costs lead to “the cost” of energy being
4
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Figure 2: Comparison of cost optimal and regulated energy performance levels
for multi-dwelling buildings.
represented as higher in microeconomic analyses than macro. The higher the
cost of energy represented in a CBA, the greater the relative value of energy sav-
ings.
3 Cost optimal energy efficiency levels in the UK, Den-
mark and Germany
Figure 2 shows the calculated cost optimal performance levels for new build flats
across the UK nations, Denmark and Germany (calculations for single-family
houses showed a similar pattern). The figure also shows the regulated standards
each MS reported to the commission. All three states found their regulations
in force met or exceeded the cost optimal level (so avoiding having to justify or
change regulations to comply with the directive). However, in spite of the UK’s
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slightly warmer climate2 the UK calculated cost optimal levels to be higher than
Denmark or Germany.
3.1 Different analytical perspectives
Why was this? The three countries drew on their own data for variables such as
prices for energy and efficiency measures, climate, architectural styles, and for
standard building physics modelling. These differences are important to differ-
ences between the countries’ results, but here I focus on differences in how they
were combined in each country’s CBA. In particular, UK cost-optimality was de-
rived from macroeconomic calculations whereas Denmark and Germany used
a microeconomic approach. As the Commission required states report both ap-
proaches it is straightforward to examine the impact of these choices.
Figure 3 shows Danish global costs calculated from both micro- and macroeco-
nomic perspectives for a range of packages (in this case, retrofitted to a 1960s
house3). The microeconomic packages produce a curve similar to that envisaged
by the commission (figure 1) with a minimum in the region of 120 kWh/m2a.
However, from a macroeconomic perspective overall costs were calculated to be
considerably lower at less exacting standards. Had the cost optimum been based
on a macroeconomic calculation the corresponding demand would have been 270
kWh/m2a — more than twice as high.
The Danish analysis used a discount rate of 3%/year for both macro- and micro-
economic analysis, meaning the impact of the time-discounting was the same in
both approaches. The principal difference between the two perspectives is the
costs represented in each. For example, the Danish microeconomic analysis rep-
resents electricity costs as being on average 2.9 times higher than from a macroe-
conomic perspective. One aspect of this difference is the inclusion of taxes. Den-
mark levies energy taxes at considerably higher rates than most other European
countries4 so efficiency packages that save energy also save tax. Furthermore,
Danish energy taxes include a CO2 tax (alongside other charges), so the inclusion
2According to Eurostat (table [nrg esdgr a]) the UK on average has 3,100 heating degree days
per year while Germany and Denmark have 3,200 and 3,500 respectively.
3N.B. figure 2 shows cost optimal levels for new buildings. This is why the energy demand for
the packages considered in figure 3 are considerably higher.
4Energy taxes account for around 4% of overall Danish tax income http://stats.oecd.
org/OECDStat_Metadata/ShowMetadata.ashx?Dataset=REVDNK&ShowOnWeb=true&
Lang=en
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Figure 3: Danish cost optimal calculations for a 1960s single-family house retrofit
(using a heat pump)
of greenhouse gasses in the macroeconomic analysis does not represent an addi-
tional cost excluded from the microeconomic approach.
The UK macroeconomic approach to cost optimality drew on5 guidance set out
by the UK Treasury and UK Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC)
for appraising policy options. The analysis used the government’s standard 3.5%
discount rate (HM Treasury, 2003), higher than both the Danish microeconomic
discount rate and the rate required by the Commission for sensitivity analysis
(3%). Figure 4 shows the result of this calculation (solid line). In common with the
5The Commission set minimum greenhouse gas costs to be used in macroeconomic analysis
which were generally lower than those recommended by DECC (2009, 2015). While the UK anal-
ysis included UK carbon costs in its sensitivity analysis it was the lower Commission costs that
were used in the core cost optimality calculations.
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Figure 4: UK cost calculations for different energy performance levels for a new-
build mid-floor flat
Danish analysis in figure 3, the least efficient package showed the lowest global
cost in the macroeconomic analysis, and in the UK case this was the reason for
identifying this level of energy performance as “cost-optimal”.
What would have happened if the UK had based “cost-optimality” on a microe-
conomic analysis? The difference in the represented value of energy savings each
year is not as significant as in the Danish case because the UK has a lower tax
rate (5% for domestic energy supply). The exclusion of carbon costs from the mi-
croeconomic analysis, unlike the Danish case, is not compensated for by a carbon
tax.6. Nonetheless, microeconomic energy costs used in the UK analysis were
6Indeed, Advani et al. (2013) argue that because VAT on domestic energy is below the standard
VAT rate domestic gas includes an implicit carbon subsidy of £19/tCO2
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considerably higher than macroeconomic costs (e.g. by a factor of 1.9 for fossil
gas). However, when presenting a microeconomic analysis the UK used a higher
discount rate of 6%. This partially offset the additional value of energy savings
from a microeconomic perspective (dashed line, figure 4), though on this analysis
the global costs were quite similar for packages down to around 60 kWh/m2a
(i.e. down to the levels Germany and Denmark calculated as optimal, figure 2).
Had the UK used Denmark’s 3% microeconomic discount rate (dotted line, fig-
ure 4) a clearer cost minimum in the range 60–85 kWh/m2a would have been
found.
Germany, like Denmark, based its definition of cost-optimal on micro-economic
analysis. However, differences in energy costs between the two perspectives were
small compared with UK and Danish differences (German microeconomic costs
around a third higher than macroeconomic for non-electricity energy vectors).
The German analysis differentiated micro- and macroeconomic energy costs only
by inclusion/exclusion of taxes (i.e. the notion of non-variable costs was not used,
Buildings Performance Institute Europe, 2013). The similarity of energy costs
across the two perspectives, coupled with similar discount rates (3.5% micro-, 3%
macro-) meant the optimality calculations were broadly similar across perspec-
tives. For new buildings both perspectives found the same performance stan-
dards to be cost-optimal (and these were also the regulatory standards in force at
the time).
3.2 Different approaches to sensitivity
The EU Commission’s guidance required that:
if packages have the same or very similar costs, the package with the
lower primary energy use (= left border of the cost-optimal range)
should if possible guide the definition of the cost-optimum level. (Eu-
ropean Commission, 2012, p. 25, “left border” refers to packages rep-
resented in the format of figure 1)
The operationalisation of “very similar costs” was left to MSs discretion. The
UK reported a range of efficiency levels for new buildings for which the global
cost was within 5% of the lowest cost package (though stuck with the least cost
package as the “cost-optimal”). The corresponding German analysis used a cost
range of 2%. While this gives the impression that the UK analysis was more
willing to countenance higher-cost packages, the analyses represented upfront
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costs in different ways. In the UK analysis the capital cost of energy efficiency was
represented as the additional cost implied by a package compared to constructing
a building at a basic efficiency level. In Germany the whole cost of construction
was included. That is, whereas the UK examined the costs of making a building
energy efficient, the German analysis examined the costs of making an energy
efficient building.
German costs for new buildings were estimated around AC800/m2 for flats and
AC1200/m2 for semi-detached homes. Were costs of this order of magnitude to be
included in the UK analysis, the 5% range for additional costs would correspond to
about 1% of total costs. In this respect the UK’s sensitivity analysis was relatively
conservative.
The German and UK reports also conducted sensitivity analyses by varying cal-
culation parameters. For new buildings the UK report examined three addi-
tional scenarios: low and high energy prices, and different discount rates (3%
for macroeconomic analysis, as required by the EU Commission, and 10% for mi-
croeconomic analysis). The German report explored just one additional scenario
in which assumed energy prices were higher and discount rates used were lower
(0% for macro- and 1.3% for microeconomic analysis). The German sensitivity
analysis specifically examined conditions under which cost-optimal levels were
likely to be more energy efficient, and indeed this was what the analysis found.
For example, the basic calculation for a semi-detached house had found the cost-
optimal level to be 74 kWh/m2a whereas under the sensitivity scenario this fell
to 63 kWh/m2a on a microeconomic analysis and just 35 kWh/m2a on a macroe-
conomic analysis.7 These levels were well below German building standards in
force at the time, a point the German report highlighted.
The UK sensitivity analysis can be read as exploring the space around the cost-
optimal calculation, in contrast with the German report’s exploration of the most
efficient levels that could be considered cost-optimal. The UK analysis nonethe-
less did include scenarios under which the lowest cost package was considerably
more efficient than the basic calculation,8 a result the report did not draw atten-
tion to. Indeed, the UK report stated:
7The macroeconomic calculation produced a lower cost optimal than the microeconomic anal-
ysis in spite of energy costs being represented as lower because of the zero discount rate applied.
8For mid-floor flats, a microeconomic analysis with a discount rate of 6% and high energy
prices found the lowest cost efficiency level to be 78kWh/m2a (table 5.4c). This was lower than
both the 116kWh/m2a found as optimal by the basic calculation and the regulated levels in force
at the time which ranged from 91kWh/m2a in Scotland to 99kWh/m2a in England.
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It is worth also reviewing the uncertainty shown in the sensitivity re-
sults. Even if the minimum in the range for each reference building
was taken, the current technical standards would be close to or better
than the cost optimal levels. (p. 67)
4 Discussion
The Energy Performance of Buildings Directive contributes to the financialisation
of policy making in the sense discussed by Chiapello (2014). However, although
the Commission both required energy efficiency regulations to be judged through
CBA and went some way to constrain how MSs conducted these calculations, its
guidance left considerable scope for discretion. As the calculations reviewed in
this paper demonstrate this discretion was consequential. Differences in what the
UK, Denmark and Germany reported as cost-optimal energy performance stan-
dards do not reduce to differences in local material conditions (such as climate
or architectural styles), nor to local market conditions (such as energy prices). In
addition to these factors, I have shown that differences in calculation techniques
significantly shaped what each state reported to be cost-optimal. I suggest that
these differences are arbitrary in the sense that there is no legitimate standard of
correctness against which different approaches may be judged. Indeed, this is
highlighted by the fact that each is compatible with the EU Commission’s guid-
ance, which itself acknowledges that different approaches “have a specific ratio-
nale and inform on different issues” (European Commission, 2012, p. 14).
An overall pattern emerges from the contrast between the UK on the one hand
and Denmark and Germany on the other. For the following reasons the German
and Danish analyses tend toward lower demand levels being deemed optimal
than the UK approach:
• The UK used macroeconomic calculations in which the representation of
energy costs (and hence the value of energy savings) are low relative to a
microeconomic calculation.
• When conducting microeconomic analysis energy costs are discounted in
the UK at a relatively high rate (6% compared with Denmark’s 3% and Ger-
many’s 3.5%).
• The UK’s operationalisation of “the same or very similar” costs for pack-
ages more efficient than the lowest cost package is relatively conservative.
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• The UK used sensitivity analysis to explore the space around the core cal-
culation, including low energy price scenarios which would tend to make
the cost-optimal less energy efficient. By contrast Germany examined only
one alternative scenario whose parameters tended to make the cost-optimal
level more energy efficient.
4.1 Approaches to cost optimality as embedded in broader en-
ergy policies
If the choice of calculation method shaped outcomes, why did the countries se-
lect the methods they did? Here I want to explore the relationship between the
energy performance of buildings and broader energy policy issues. I do this not
to suggest that the three governments intentionally selected approaches on the
basis of the outcomes they produced. Rather, I suggest that different calculative
approaches reflect different meanings of “cost-optimal” energy efficiency embed-
ded in broader energy policy styles, and the methods used in reporting under the
EPBD draw on calculative approaches already established in each state.
The options countenanced by energy policy makers for energy supply are more
constrained in Germany and Denmark than the UK. The German Energiewende
is oriented to achieving significant reductions in CO2 emissions and phasing out
nuclear power (Huß, 2014). Exploration of Carbon Capture and Sequestration
(CCS) proved controversial (Geels et al., 2016) and the technology is now not
included in the German Government’s future energy scenario analyses. These
instead focus on renewable energy supply (BMWi, 2014). Danish scenarios sim-
ilarly do not envisage nuclear power or CCS, instead setting targets for 100%
renewable energy (by 2035 for heating and electricity generation, and by 2050
for all applications, Danish Government, 2013). By contrast UK policy is broadly
constructed around three potential pathways (nuclear, CCS and renewables, HM
Government, 2011), each of which is (ostensibly) being kept open as a possibil-
ity.
The range of high-level energy supply options considered is consequential for the
specificity of long-term targets for energy efficiency. Among the targets articu-
lated in German policy, fossil fuel used as a primary energy source for buildings
is planned to reduce by 80% by 2050 against a 2005-08 baseline (DENA, 2015).
In principle this could be achieved by some combination of reducing final en-
ergy demand (energy efficiency) and replacing fossil fuels with renewable energy.
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Consultancy analysis for the Federal government has found that limits to feasi-
ble levels of both renewable energy and energy efficiency translate the 80% target
into a very narrow range of possibilities: virtually the full technical potential for
energy demand reduction through improving the fabric would be required (per-
sonal communication with the consultants). Similarly, Danish energy efficiency
targets (35% reduction in buildings heat demand) are set by reference to what is
considered feasible rather than optimal (Danish Government, 2014).
The variety of energy supply technologies envisaged in UK energy scenarios
corresponds to a variety of energy efficiency outcomes. Constraints on renew-
able production potential are less pressing if nuclear and CCS are also assumed
to be available. This is reflected in UK Government energy system-wide cost-
optimisation modelling which find the degree of demand reduction required by
2050 greenhouse gas targets is dependent on production technologies: a nuclear-
oriented scenario corresponds to 31% demand reduction whereas a renewables-
oriented scenario corresponds to 54% reduction (DECC, 2012).9
In addition to differences in how constrained long-term energy efficiency visions
are, UK policy makers differ from their German and Danish counterparts in how
near-term action is conceived. Danish policy emphasises limits to opportuni-
ties for energy efficient retrofit, identifying these with periodic refurbishment of
building elements (walls, roofs, etc.). The low frequency of these refurbishments
means each building is considered to effectively have just one opportunity for an
energy upgrade before the 2050 (or even 2035) target dates (Danish Government,
2014). Indeed, in Denmark’s EUPBD cost-optimality report, limited opportuni-
ties are used to justify lowering the discount rate for sensitivity analyses:
In some cases the discount rate also includes a “safety” factor based
on the viewpoint: It is more safe to delay the investment and see how
the situation and solutions develops than to invest now. This is a good
approach in most cases where the investment can be done at any time
later — but it is not a good solution in case of adding energy efficiency
to a building only being constructed or renovated one-off. (Danish
Buildings Research Institute, 2013, 42)
Danish policy discourse thus stresses the importance of ensuring near-term ren-
ovation is “future-proofed” for long term energy efficiency requirements (Danish
Government, 2014). Similarly, German long-range scenarios for energy efficiency
have been translated into pressure for near-term action. The German Energy
9Demand reduction is expressed as per capita energy saving from a 2007 baseline.
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Agency (DENA) calculated that between 2005 and 2008, the measure-weighted
rate at which the building stock was being renovated was 0.8%/year. This figure
was regarded too low, with 2%/year being identified as necessary to meet overar-
ching targets (DENA, 2015, 112). Furthermore, policy makers describe near-term
changes to the building stock in terms of their long-term impact:
the goals we have in Germany means there’s no space for surplus [en-
ergy demand] of new buildings. If you consider, for example, now
we have 0.5% of building stock built as new building each year. So
within the next 40 years that velocity will have like 20% of building
stock coming on plus. Of course they’re a lot better than old buildings
but if they are three times better it is a surplus of 5, 6, 7% extra. And
there’s no space for these 5, 6, 7% on top of 0% surplus. (Interview:
German Energy Efficiency Federal Policy Officer 1, 2015)
By contrast, the translation of long-term goals into near-term objectives in the UK
is more complex. The opportunity costs of taking action too early are consid-
ered relevant to policy (though this doesn’t form a defined trajectory for energy
efficiency):
this is true across the whole of the sort of carbon budgeting frame-
works, [. . . ] if you’re looking to achieve improvements in the most
cost effective way, simply saying that you need to do however many
hundred thousand or million homes a year [. . . ] is one way of mod-
elling it. There might be reason to believe actually that costs will fall,
and therefore in fact you will reduce your costs if you wait to carry
out certain types of activities. [. . . ] there might be a better sense in
tackling some of the cheaper things earlier, and leaving some of the
costlier things until later. (UK Government Senior Energy Policy Offi-
cer, 2016)
In Doganova and Karnøe’s (2015) terms, Danish and German policy discourses
juxtapose the costs of tightening energy efficiency standards with imperatives to
make progress toward lower energy demand in buildings. In the UK, lower-
ing energy demand is considered a value to be weighed with a multiplicity of
other values to achieve an overarching economic optimum. This difference cor-
responds to different policy approaches, exemplified particularly by German do-
mestic approach to calculating energy efficiency standards. German legislation
requires that energy efficiency requirements are “economically viable” from the
14
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building occupant’s (i.e. microeconomic) perspective.10
To enforce something like this, the politicians decided that [it would
be possible] only if we can [. . . ] show by example to people that [. . . ]
at the end [the requirements are] to the benefit of most people, and it
is to their personal [. . . ] financial gain to obey them. (German Energy
Efficiency Federal Policy Officer 2, 2015.)
Against this backdrop we can make sense of the differences between the UK’s ap-
proach to calculating cost-optimality for the EPBD and Denmark and Germany’s.
Where domestic policy identifies near-term imperatives achieve very high levels
of energy efficiency, the meaning of “cost-optimal” can be unpacked as legitimat-
ing the costs of energy efficiency to the building owners/purchasers who pay for
them. Hence a microeconomic perspective is considered appropriate, and pol-
icy makers have an interest in exploring how far energy efficiency can be pushed
within the bounds of cost-optimal calculations. In UK policy pressures for energy
efficiency over the near and long terms are construed in more diffuse terms and
objectives are more ambiguous. In this context the meaning of “cost-optimal” can
be unpacked as seeking a balance between energy efficiency and other objectives,
and the UK’s default approach to judging policy in terms of opportunity costs
leads to the macroeconomic approach. As energy efficiency is thus constructed
in policy as (just) another value against which to weigh others, sensitivity analy-
sis expores a range of “reasonable” variable values rather than focusing only on
those that would justify higher energy performance standards.
5 Conclusion
Differences between the EPBD cost optimality approaches reviewed here can
be understood as reflecting different evaluation cultures (MacKenzie and Spears,
2014): energy efficiency holds a different ontological position in different coun-
tries, and analyses drew on extant policy conventions that vary across countries
(and into which analysts have arguably been socialised through training, explicit
guidance documents and the need to communicate with colleagues who also use
those conventions). My argument is not that national governments gerryman-
dered their calculations to ensure their outcome minimised the gap between “cost
optimal” levels and existing regulation. The compatibility between extant policy
10This is operationalised as the discounted payback period being less than 20 years.
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objectives and the outcome of cost-optimality calculations can be understood in-
stead as mediated by broader conventions that shape the form and meaning of
calculative practices.
These observations illustrate the possibility for diversity in financialised policy
making in Chiapello’s (2014) terms. Calculation of Net Present Value (one of Chi-
apello’s three characteristic approaches to financialised valuation) leaves open
scope for consequential differences of approach. In addition to her call for con-
sideration of “contrary and alternative currents” to financialisation, we should
also consider alternatives within a financialised approach to open space for criti-
cal engagement with policy development.
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